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Abstract: Administered protection is not the only outcome of antidump-
ing measures. This paper suggests a basic model of repeated interaction
between a domestic and a foreign firm. Competing in prices in the im-
porting market, antidumping action serves as the means to enforce and
sustain tacit collusion between the firms. The main result is that price
distortions by antidumping policy are a departure point for the achieve-
ment of the collusive outcome. Discount factors of future profits are al-
tered relative to those observed under free trade, delaying domestic firm’s
propensity to collude and prompting foreign firm’s.
Keywords: price competition, repeated interaction, tacit collusion, anti-
dumping.
Resumen: La protección administrada no es el único resultado del uso de
medidas antidumping. Aquí se sugiere un modelo de interacción repetida
entre una firma doméstica y una extranjera, que compiten en precios en
el mercado de importación, donde las medidas antidumping actúan como
medio para alcanzar y sostener un acuerdo de colusión tácita. El resulta-
do principal es que la distorsión de precios causada por la política
antidumping es el punto de partida para alcanzar el acuerdo colusivo.
Los factores de descuento de ganancias futuras de las empresas se ven
alterados en relación con sus valores de libre comercio, retrasando la pro-
pensión a coludirse de la firma doméstica y acelerando la de la firma
extranjera.
Palabras clave: competencia en precios, interacción repetida, colusión
tácita, antidumping.
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Introduction
ccording to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) dumping occurs
when the price of an exported good is lower than the home mar-
ket price of that good. In other words, exports are sold at unfair value
in the importing country because their price is lower than the price
consumers pay for the same good in the exporting country. Article VI
of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) allow country
members to levy duties on dumped imports under three conditions to
be satisfied altogether:
1) Dumping exists (dumping margin).
2) The domestic industry is suffering material injury, is threat-
ened of material injury or its establishment is materially re-
tarded because of imports.
3) There is a causal relationship between the two.
Although GATT’s Antidumping Code was submitted in 1976, many
country members already counted with their own national antidump-
ing (AD) rules, and it was only after 1979 Tokyo Round Agreement
that the increasing use of AD measures raised big concerns on the
actual motives of its use. Amendments to the rules in the Tokyo Round
agreement introduced sales below cost as a dumping practice and re-
moved the need to proof material injury, which boosted AD actions
from less than a dozen cases per year in the 1960’s to about 250 cases
per year in recent years (Prusa and Skeath, 2001).
Study of the motives of the surge in the use of AD has been devel-
oped mainly by focusing on the AD practice of “traditional users” such
as the US and the EU, who together with Canada, Australia and New
Zealand have been the major users of AD measures. Nevertheless, de-
veloping countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, India, South
Korea, among others, the “new users”, have filed since the late 1980’s
more AD petitions than the traditional users (see below).1
The aim of this paper is to show that AD policy may serve as a
mean to achieve tacit collusion between the domestic and the foreign
firms or industries involved in an AD petition in the importing mar-
ket. The analysis focuses on the proceedings of the Mexican AD policy,
which are different from other AD legislations, specifically in the US
A
1 See Miranda et al. (1998) for worldwide use of antidumping. Zanardi (2002) gives a more
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and EU. Private settlements between the parties involved in the AD
investigations are not allowed, and price undertakings are rarely ob-
served.2 It also intends to address the topic from a developing country’s
point of view and to build on current debates on antidumping and its
abuse.3 The question posed in the title of the paper also intends to
motivate for an active debate on the effects of AD policy beyond its
traditional protectionist outcome. Increasing awareness of the poten-
tial welfare losses arising from anticompetitive outcomes led by the
use of AD should bring both AD and competition authorities closer in to
a more efficient dialogue for addressing the problem of AD.
Within a duopoly price-competition framework, the model here
presented arrives at standard results on that the introduction of AD po-
licy distorts firms’ pricing strategies. The consequence is a higher price
level in the importing market relative to the free trade Nash-equilib-
rium, i.e. no AD policy. The observed price increase serves as a departing
point towards the achievement of a collusive price agreement between
the domestic and the foreign firm. When the benchmark game is infi-
nitely repeated, the filing of an AD petition acts as the punishment
strategy from deviation, making the collusive outcome subgame per-
fect. The threshold value of the discount factors4 that make the collu-
sive conditions hold are altered when AD policy is introduced, relative
to those prevailing under free trade. This results in a higher discount
factor for the domestic firm to engage in the collusive agreement and
smaller for the foreign firm.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section I describes why it
is relevant to study AD. Section II briefly reviews the general litera-
ture on AD and section II.1 on the relationship between AD and collu-
sion. Section III and III.1 illustrate the current trends of AD measures
worldwide and in Mexico, respectively. Section IV sketches the AD pro-
ceedings under the Mexican legislation. Section V through V.3 devel-
ops the model. And section VI concludes with some final remarks.
2 A price undertaking is a commitment by the foreign firm to raise its export price or
reduce the quantity exported. Both the private settlement and the price undertaking result in
the suspension or termination of the case. Prusa (1992) first introduced the collusive conse-
quences of withdrawn cases in the US.
3 Despite the fact that new users are currently very active players in the AD field, research
focusing on them is still scarce. See for instance Prusa and Skeath (2000), Esquivel and Solis
(2002), Niels (2002).
4 A discount factor can be interpreted as the patience of firms to achieve long-term gains.44 Mendieta: Alternative Effects of Antidumping Policy
I. Relevance of the Study of Antidumping
It is important to say, first, that this paper deals with the analysis of
the use of AD rather than dumping mainly because price discrimina-
tion is far considered a common practice in international trade.5 Viner
(1923) considered dumping or price discrimination an efficient mo-
nopoly practice accepted when consumers benefited from low prices.
For instance, a monopoly will export at a low price to obtain economies
of large scale or maintain full capacity without reducing its domestic
price providing consumers in the importing market with a flow of cheap
goods. Similarly, Brander and Krugman (1983) show how a monopoly
price discriminates across markets and reciprocal dumping arise (com-
petitors dumping to each others’ domestic market). Dumping below
cost has also been showed to be efficient under demand uncertainty
(Davies and McGuiness, 1982; Ethier, 1982), under imperfect infor-
mation of future rents (Clarida, 1993), or with incomplete and asym-
metric information (Hartigan, 1994). Nevertheless, the regard of dump-
ing as an unfair trade practice as well as the increasing use of AD
measures has made researchers focus on the causes and effects of the
latter.6 As said above, research bias towards traditional users does
not give account of the matter in developing countries. Moreover, the
debate on AD was an important component of the agenda in the last
WTO conference in Doha, and in consequence incorporated as a core
issue in the ministerial meeting of Cancún.7
II. Previous Work on Antidumping
There is a large strand of literature concerned on the protectionist
use of AD since more trade liberalisation practices have been encour-
aged and traditional trade barriers eliminated; AD measures being
the only permitted protectionist device. Much of the analysis of the
use of AD here is based on macroeconomic and political factors that
induce domestic firms to claim AD action.8 AD is also considered as a
5 See Dale (1980) for a clear appraisal of the economic foundations of dumping and anti-
dumping.
6 See Finger et al. (1982), Ethier and Fischer (1987), Fischer (1992), Anderson (1992) for
first addressing of antidumping.
7 However, due to the failure of the ministerial meeting in Cancún, no agreement was
reached with this regard. See Evenett (2003), for instance, for comments on the failure of Cancún.
8 See Finger et al. (1982), Yarrow (1987), Feinberg (1989), Knetter and Prusa (2003), Niels (2002).economía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XIV, núm. 1, primer semestre de 2005 45
necessary condition for the enforcement of trade liberalisation prac-
tices and a guarantee for the domestic industry against unfair trade
practices.9 Similarly, another large strand of the literature has addres-
sed the issue relying on the industrial organisation framework for the
analysis. The focus is on the strategic behaviour of firms, i.e. the choice
of price or quantity levels, facing AD actions where trade protection is
endogenous to firms’strategic behaviour.10
Bolingen and Prusa (2001) provide an extensive description of the
work carried out on the different market outcomes resulting from the in-
troduction of AD policy. They can range from trade and investment
diversion to collusion.
II.1. Antidumping and Collusion
Evidence of collusive agreements between domestic and foreign firms
or among domestic firms by means of AD action has been proved in
different occasions. One case, for instance, involved a cartel of US pro-
ducers of ferrosilicon who claimed AD action against five foreign compe-
titors. With the cartel’s sales restrictions accepted as proof of injury,
duties were levied in 1993. The cartel then invited Brazilian producers,
who started to export to the US, to form part of the agreement, but as
the offer was not accepted AD action was claimed again and duties
imposed. Later, the cartel was discovered and members found guilty.
Similarly, in New York in 1995, a foreign firm argued that an AD ac-
tion was exercised against it as a response by the domestic firm for
the negative to accept a collusive agreement (Taylor, 2001, p. 2).
Looking at the relationship between cartels and AD within the
European Community (EC), Messerlin (1990) observes that, during
1980-87, those cases claiming AD action in the chemical industry had a
twin case in an anticartel investigation. About 25% of the EC anticartel
cases were related to products also involved in AD cases, suggesting
that the imposition of duties grants a high level of protection to the
industry, which is essentially needed for the generation of a more stable
and strong cartel. Therefore, he suggests that AD actions should be
subordinated to competition law.
09 See Kholer (2001).
10 Leidy and Hoekman (1990), Fischer (1992), Anderson (1992), Reitzes (1993), Prusa (1994),
Kolev and Prusa (1999), Pauwels, Vandenbussche and Waverbergh (2001).46 Mendieta: Alternative Effects of Antidumping Policy
A great number of AD cases in the US are withdrawn before reach-
ing a final decision. It is calculated that trade restrictions generated
by withdrawn cases during the period 1980-82 were at least as much
as those generated by cases that ended up in an AD duty. Accordingly,
withdrawn cases, which can result from a private settlement between
the foreign and domestic firms or from an agreement between the
foreign firm and the domestic government to restrain the quantity or
increase the price of imports, may produce a collusive outcome with
AD policy facilitating practice (Prusa, 1992). This is possible since a set-
tlement reached by rival firms can benefit both and there exists an
antitrust exemption that supports the achievement of a settlement and
allows the petitioner to withdraw when this is reached (Prusa, 1992,
p. 6).11 AD proceedings in the US provide the possibility for settle-
ments reached either privately or under government intervention be-
fore the AD authority submits the final decision of the petition. Using
a bargaining game to solve for the optimal settlement in a duopoly
Bertrand-Nash framework, Prusa’s model predicts that firms will always
prefer a settlement to the authority’s final decision. By negotiating,
the foreign firm will at least avoid paying for the duty and the domestic
firm will at least get the duty outcome profits. Therefore, that any
settled outcome can result in collusive behaviour evidence that firms
use AD for motives different from those originally intended by the law.
Different studies followed Prusa’s work in the investigation of the
incentives of firms to choose whether to withdraw the AD petition or
wait for the authority’s final decision. Bargaining power and coordi-
nation costs of the domestic and foreign firm affect their decision to
whether or not accept the settlement. However, profits under a settle-
ment are greater than expected profits under the imposition of duties,
thus supporting the hypothesis that AD is used as a mean to achieve
collusion (Zanardi, 2000). Asymmetric information is another reason
why withdrawn cases are observed (Panagariya and Gupta, 1998). In
their model, firms will always privately negotiate on the price under
complete information, and the case is withdrawn with the likely joint
profit maximisation similarly to Prusa (1992). Nevertheless, when
information is asymmetric, for instance, on the possible level of the
duty (i.e. one firm knows the level of the duty and the other does not),
the outcome may rather result in the firms waiting for the final deci-
sion and duties paid.
11 This is the Noer-Pennington doctrine. See Taylor (2001) below.economía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XIV, núm. 1, primer semestre de 2005 47
Taylor (2001), contrarily, argues that settlements that induce the
withdrawal of petitions have no collusive effects. Moreover, any collu-
sive agreement triggered by the use of AD law cannot be exempt of
antitrust action and the Noer-Pennington doctrine does not allow for
such exemption, but considers any private attempt to affect prices or
quantities illegal. Empirical evidence shows that only two out of six-
teen withdrawn cases during 1990-97 show price and quantity collu-
sive consistent movements.12 Nevertheless, the author argues that these
exceptional cases might owe this behaviour to factors rather different
from collusion, for instance, product market share and non-subject to
antidumping investigation suppliers, though this is not addressed in
the paper.
When AD policy is introduced, it can also have an important im-
pact on the initial market structure of the industry. AD policy can be
either pro-competitive or anticompetitive depending on i) the specifica-
tion of the government’s welfare objective function, ii) the cost asymme-
try between domestic and foreign firms, and iii) the degree of product
differentiation between the firms (Veugelers and Vandenbussche, 1999).
These three key factors together determine the type of AD measure im-
posed by the government, the incentives of firms to collude and the
resulting market structure when AD policy is introduced. Accordingly,
when firms are symmetric and products homogeneous, a cartel formed
by domestic and foreign firms will prevail with or without AD policy
and similarly, when cost asymmetries are small and the government
maximises total national welfare, the existence of AD policy promotes
the formation of a cartel.
Finally, Staiger and Wolak (1986) show that AD policy is used as a
punishment device, named the filing of an AD petition, allowing firms
to coordinate their capacity strategies towards the monopoly outcome
in a low demand environment.
So far, I have presented enough evidence that supports the hy-
pothesis that firms use AD measures in order to pursue specific out-
comes that are not solely related to the deterrence of unfair trade
practices (by the imposition of duties), as aimed by AD policy. And
these outcomes are achievable because the threat of the imposition of
duties is credible and then, in some cases, duties need not to be im-
posed or even the petition reached its final decision.
12 The products that showed price increase and quantity decrease are steel wire rod (from
Belgium) and bulk ibuprofen (from India).48 Mendieta: Alternative Effects of Antidumping Policy
III. Worldwide Antidumping Trends
National AD rules were introduced in the early 1900 by Canada, New
Zealand, Australia and the United States with the aim of sheltering
domestic firms from foreign rivals that could exert monopoly power
after predatory pricing practices. It was only after a law submitted by
the United States in 1921 and followed by many other countries when
AD law considered unfair the subside of low-price exports by home
protected foreign firms or cartels. Signature of the 1947 GATT agree-
ment brought together all national AD rules, with big influence of the
US own AD law.13 From then to the early 1970’s, there were not many
AD cases: the US, the EU, Australia, Canada, South Africa and New
Zealand were the major users of AD measures. During this period, less
than 5% of all cases resulted in duties (Bloningen and Prusa, 2001).
After the Tokyo Round, the use of AD changed sharply. As many as
twice the cases filed during the 1970’s were filed in the 1980’s. From
1980 to 1985, traditional users filed more than 99% of all AD petitions,
whereas by the mid 1990’s more than half of the petitions were filed
by new users (see Figure 1). During the period 1987-97, China, the
US, Korea, Japan and Brazil were the most targeted countries by AD
actions; and base metals, chemicals, machinery and electrical equip-
ment and plastics the most targeted industries (see Table 1).
13 See Barcelo (1991) and Horlick and Shea (1995) on the history of AD.
Table 1. Main Target Countries and Industries in AD Investigations
(1987-97)
Rank Target country (% of total) Target industry (% of total)
1 China (11.3) Base metals (25.3)
2 United States (8.6) Chemicals (16.8)
3 Korea (6.3) Machinery and electrical equipment (13.5)
4 Japan (6.3) Plastics (11.4)
5 Brazil (4.8) Textiles (6.9)
6 Taiwan (4.6) Pulp and paper (5.1)
7 Germany (4.2) Glass and ceramics (3.4)
8 Thailand (2.8) Prepared foodstuffs (2.8)
9 India (2.8) Other manufactures (2.5)
10 United Kingdom (2.5) Minerals (2.4)
Source: Niels, 2002, table 2.2.economía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XIV, núm. 1, primer semestre de 2005 49
III.1. Antidumping Trends in Mexico
AD rules in Mexico were adopted as the country became a member of
GATT in 1986 and outlined by the Ministry of Trade and Industry (cur-
rently The Ministry of the Economy) through the Unfair Trade Prac-
tices Regulations. Currently, the International Trade Practices Unit
at the Ministry of the Economy is in charge of the administration of
the AD process. The legal framework is contained in the Foreign Com-
merce Law Regulations published in 1993.14
Mexico’s AD (and CVD)15 cases are registered from 1987 in the Mexi-
can Official Journal. Nevertheless, Mexico’s participation in AD activi-
ties dates from time before. Prusa and Skeath (2000) point out that
Mexico was investigated for dumping exports before it had set up its
own national rules. Many other new users were also investigated for
dumping exports before having their own AD policy. This, argues the
author, suggests that motives different from those to fight unfair trade
practices, such as retaliation, are a driving force for the use of AD
measures in developing countries.
Figure 1. Worldwide AD Cases Initiated, 1980-2001
14 See Malpica de la Madrid (1998) for the legal structure of the Mexican AD system.
15 A CVD (countervailing duty) is aimed to defend the domestic industry against the dam-
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Niels (2002) describes the evolution of AD activity in Mexico from
1987 to 2000 based on a database (SIAM) built by the Directorate Gen-
eral for Economic Studies of the Mexican Federal Competition Com-
mission. During that period, a total of 172 AD cases had been investi-
gated from which 107 (62.2%) resulted in the imposition of duties, 6
(3.5%) in undertakings, and 54 (31.4%) in a negative outcome (no duty
imposition)16 (see Figure 2).
With regard to the targeted countries and industries, Table 2 shows
the regions and number of investigations involved. North America
is the most targeted region, which is not surprising as more than 70% of
Mexican exports are directed to the US; however, the success rate for
the region is below the total success rate, which according to Niels sug-
gests the political influence on the use of AD, e.g. avoiding to quarrel
with trade partners. East Asia, the EU and the rest of the world show
a success rate above the total rate. The steel industry has filed the
largest number of AD petitions (30.8% of the total), followed by the chemi-
cal industry (22.7%), textiles (9.9%), plastics (7.0%) and electrical equip-
ment (5.2%). The methodology used to determine the fair or normal
Figure 2. Number and Outcome of Mexican Antidumping
Investigations
16 This figure is different from the one given by the antidumping authority because of the
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value of the subject imports was based in 47.7% of all the cases on the
home price or normal value, 16.3% on the export price to a third coun-
try, 25% on the constructed value and in 15.1% of the cases the meth-
odology was not reported.17 Only in 66 cases the imposition of an ad
valorem duty was reported and, when imposed, it was generally very
high. The unweighted average duty is of 53 percent.
Table 2. Target Regions and Number of Mexican Antidumping
Investigations and Success Rate (1987-2000)
Share of
Number of investigations Success rate
Target region investigations (%) (%)a
North America
(US and Canada) 59 34.3 63.8
Latin America
(Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia,
Argentina and Chile) 30 17.4 55.2
East Asia
(China, South Korea, Taiwan,
Japan, Hong Kong
and Malaysia) 46 26.7 74.4
EU 17 9.9 82.4





and Bulgaria) 15 8.7 66.7
Rest of the world
(Australia, India, Pakistan
and South Africa) 5 2.9 80.0
Total 172 100 67.7
a The proportion of investigations resulting in a positive outcome, i.e. duties or undertaking.
Source: Niels, 2002.
17 According to Mexican legislation, prices of domestic sales in the exporting market are
the first option to determine the normal value. If sales in the exporting country market are not
made “in the ordinary course of trade” so that normal value cannot be calculated, two other
alternatives are provided: the third country normal price which is based on a comparable price
of the subject product when exported to an appropriate third country; and the constructed
normal value which is based on costs of production, general administrative expenses and prof-
its (www.economia.gob.mx).52 Mendieta: Alternative Effects of Antidumping Policy
IV. Mexican Antidumping Proceedings
Unfair trade practices in Mexico are sanctioned under four legal in-
struments: the Foreign Commerce Law, the Foreign Commerce Law
Regulations, the Agreement on the Application of Article VI of GATT
(1994) and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
This framework “offers to the national industry a timely defence sys-
tem against dumping or price discrimination practices and subsidies
which ensures fair level competition conditions for the performance of
the Mexican industry”.18
In order to claim an AD action, three conditions must be met:
1) Dumping exists (dumping margin).
2) The domestic industry is suffering material injury, is threat-
ened of material injury or its establishment is materially re-
tarded because of imports.
3) There is a causal relationship between the two.
According to Mexican legislation and once these conditions are
met, the interested firms can file a petition if i) they represent at least
25% of the national production of the subject product, and ii) the peti-
tion is supported by 50% of the national producers. An organisation or
association acting on behalf of the interested industry or firms can
also file the petition. Henceforth, the terms firms and industry are
indifferently used. The petition is filed within the International Trade
Practices Unit (UPCI, in Spanish) who is responsible of the adminis-
tration of the investigation process. All the decisions or resolutions
reached during the investigation are enforced by the Ministry of the
Economy, the authority hereafter, and published in the Official Journal.
Diagram 1 shows the AD proceedings. Once the petition is filed,
the authority will publish within 30 days, as an initial resolution, the
acceptance of the petition and initiate the investigation. Otherwise
the petition will be rejected.19
Within 130 days from the publication of the initial resolution, the
authority will publish the preliminary resolution. This will announce
18 www.economia.gob.mx. Countervailing duties (CVD) are the correspondent remedies for
subsidies. However, this paper does not consider these measures mainly because only 18 out of
234 investigations carried out by the authority refer to subsidies (UPCI, 2001). In general, AD
studies do not consider CVD.
19 Within 20 days from the petition filing, the authority may require the petitioner to
provide additional information to support the petition filing before the initial resolution is pub-
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the continuation of the investigation and the imposition of provisional
duties, if it is the case, or terminate the investigation if there is not
enough evidence of dumping margin, material injury or threat of ma-
terial injury and a causal relationship between them.20 Preliminary
Diagram 1. Mexican AD Proceedings
Petition filing.
Initial resolution.

























20 Parties are given a 20 days period from the publication of the preliminary resolution to
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duties, if imposed, will be collected by the Ministry of Treasure who
will also accept any guarantee of payment.
At any time before the publication of the final resolution, the for-
eign government or exporting firms incurring in unfair trade prac-
tices may, through a conciliatory audience, voluntarily and before the
authority commit to increase their price or stop their exports in order to
remove the dumping and injury caused. The agreement, which implies
a price undertaking with the approval of the authority, will terminate or
suspend the investigation and be published as a final resolution. Note
that the undertaking will mimic the duty outcome as it is in the interest
of the authority. 21 The authority can request and undertake any veri-
fication visit at the physical location of the firms or involved parties
to certify any information presented during the investigation. It may
also periodically review the price undertakings by petition of the in-
terested party and continue with the investigation in case the agree-
ment is not implemented. Once the investigation is concluded and
within 260 days from the publication of the initial resolution, the au-
thority will publish the final resolution. This will announce the defi-
nite imposition of duties, remove the provisional duties, or reject the
imposition of duties.
Finally, the duration of the definitive duties will be that necessary
to repair the injury caused to the industry by the unfair trade prac-
tice. They can be reviewed in a yearly basis upon petition of any of the
parties or by the authority itself in order to reduce, lift or confirm the
duty. After 5 years of duration of the duties, they will be removed
unless there has been a petition of review. This is known as the “sun-
set clause”.
V. A Basic Model of Collusion with Antidumping
In this section I develop a basic model of repeated interaction between
a duopoly formed by a domestic and a foreign firm that compete in
prices in the domestic market, i.e. Mexico. The model, built on Prusa’s
(1992), shows that amid the price distortions caused by the introduc-
tion of antidumping in a free trade state, determined by the stan-
dard duopoly Nash-equilibrium, firms achieve tacit collusion using
antidumping as the mechanism to sustain it.
21 See Prusa (1992) for the analysis of the undertaking outcome.economía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XIV, núm. 1, primer semestre de 2005 55
I first set the conditions for the one-shot static game, which repre-
sents the free trade equilibrium, this is when no antidumping legisla-
tion exists in the domestic country. This is also the benchmark case to
compare with once antidumping has been introduced. Once the dis-
tortions caused by the introduction of antidumping are shown, I turn to
the repeated game where the one-shot game is played infinitely and the
collusive outcome achieved.
The model here developed reflects the general framework of Mexi-
can AD policy where, as said before, neither price undertakings nor
the withdrawal of the case are likely. Some comments are worth men-
tioning here.
It is assumed that the n-domestic firms which join to file a petition
act as an industry or one firm, as it is a requirement for the initiation of
the investigation to represent more than 25% of the national production
as well as the support of at least 50% of national producers.22 Thus,
coordination costs are assumed to be zero so that all firms in the in-
dustry agree to file the petition. Nevertheless, these costs can be
increasing in the number of firms, i.e. the greater the number of firms
the more difficult to agree in something, and some firms may not join the
filing group (Zanardi, 2000).23 Filing costs are assumed to be small so
that petitions have already been filed. Staiger and Wolak (1994), how-
ever, point out that even though investigation effects are likely to ex-
ist,24 many industries face high filing cost, e.g. hiring lawyers, doing
market studies, organisation of the filing firms, etc., that limit the
number of filed petitions.
Private settlements or price undertakings frequently observed in
other countries are rarely observed in Mexico.25 This is likely due to
unclear undertaking rules so that petitioners do not have a good un-
derstanding of the process. The authority does not count with the re-
22 Note that, in cases where the domestic industry is highly concentrated, this require-
ment may work as an internal condition for the sustainability of a domestic cartel. Acting
individually, every firm has an incentive to join the filing group. The existence of domestic
cartels is however not considered here.
23 It may also be the case that the domestic firms coordinate to induce a positive outcome
of the investigation, for instance, by reducing profits or prices to increase the likelihood of
injury. This can be more difficult the greater the number of firms.
24 Trade restrictions caused by the only fact that the investigation has been initiated,
regardless of the final outcome.
25 Although under the AD legislation the possibility of price undertakings is present, it will
at least mirror the imposition of duties: “[…] exporters of the goods under unfair international
trade practice can voluntarily commit before the [authority] to […] modify their prices or cease
exports. […] if the [authority] corroborates that the commitment is unexercised, it will resume
the investigation of the case and if required, reimpose the provisional duty” (www.economia.
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sources to monitor the foreign firm’s price commitment, which also
makes the undertaking outcome less likely as it results an unsustain-
able solution for the petitioner.26 Moreover, private settlements are
not allowed at all.27
Lastly, for the sake of consistency with previous literature, the
construction of the model below assumes a lineal demand for the firms.
Although this may be in detriment of the generalisation of the results
reached, it is also an useful assumption for the numerical comparison
between different equilibria, i.e. free trade and AD.
Now suppose there are two firms, one domestic and one foreign (*)
that compete in price in the importing or domestic market. Each firm
sells a differentiated good, which is close substitute for each other.28
Firms face a linear demand for the goods produced and constant and sym-
metric costs per unit produced. The game played by the firms, that is
choosing price strategies, is performed in one period and played only
once.29 The events of the game occur as follows:
1) Each firm maximises profits by choosing price.
2) All equilibrium values are realized.
3) If the petition is filed, the proceedings of the investigation as
depicted in Diagram 1 are followed. There is an exogenous and
known probability a of an affirmative final resolution with du-
ties of d = pF – p* imposed to imports. pF is the price of the good
sold in the foreign firm’s own market which is exported to the
domestic market at price p*; pF is exogenous to the game.
4) With duties imposed, foreign firm collects only p* and d is the
revenue collected by the government.
5) Duties are not imposed with probability (1 – a) and the outcome
is the same as in 2).
6) Game ends.
26 These comments were taken from personal conversations with personnel from the UPCI.
27 Prusa (1992) shows that the possibility of a settlement in the investigation allows firms
to revise prices upwards and to get a better outcome relative to the imposition of duties.
28 Products under AD investigation are usually classified at their 8-digit level of the “Tarifa
del Impuesto General de Importación” which is based on the ISIC Code. Although the disaggre-
gation level aims to find substitutability between domestic and imported goods, they are never
perfect substitutes.
29 Generally, the literature on the subject specifies a two period model to introduce AD. In
the first period firms choose whether to file the petition and in the second period they choose
prices. Here, however, to make matters simple, it is assumed that the filing decision is already
taken, as I will focus only on those cases that have been investigated.economía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XIV, núm. 1, primer semestre de 2005 57
V.1. Free Trade Bertrand-Nash Equilibrium
With no AD policy in place, firms make their price decisions simulta-
neously and the game is played only once. This one-shot static game is
the benchmark case to compare with once AD policy is introduced.30
Let the respective firm’s demand function be:
q = a – p + bp* (1)
q* = a – p* + bp (2)
b represents a product differentiation parameter, which for greater
values the goods become closer substitutes. p and p* are the firm’s
price level and q and q* the quantities produced, respectively. Each
firm’s profits are given by:
p ( p, p*) = (a – p + bp*) (p – c) (3)
p*(p, p*) = (a – p* + bp) (p* – c) (4)
each firm maximises profits taking the other’s price level as given, so
that the FOC that imply each firm’s best reply function are (BR):
a – 2p + bp* + c = 0 (5)
a – 2p* + bp + c = 0 (6)
The Bertrand-Nash equilibrium pair of prices (pB, p*
B) is obtained
by the solution of the system of equations formed by (5) and (6). Thus,
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30 Similar results are reached if competition is considered in quantities instead. The Cournot-
Nash equilibrium levels are distorted as AD policy is introduced leaving the foreign firm in a
worse off position relative to free trade equilibrium levels (see below). See, for instance,
Panagariya and Gupta (1998) and Fischer (1992).
31 It is assumed that the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium satisfy the sufficient conditions to be
stable and unique.58 Mendieta: Alternative Effects of Antidumping Policy
Point B in Figure 3 represents the equilibrium price level in the
domestic market where rr and r*r* are the firms’ respective best re-
ply functions that attain the maximum isoprofit curve P
~
.
V.2. Bertrand-Nash Equilibrium with Antidumping
Now, AD policy is introduced in the domestic market. Suppose that the
domestic industry has chosen to file an AD petition. There is an exog-
enous probability of the imposition of duties to imports. The free trade
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium will prevail with probability (1 – a). With
a = 1 duties are imposed to the foreign firm exports. The value of the
duty is determined by the dumping margin d = pF – p*
B. Consequently,
the foreign firm is forced to raise its price to pF = p*
D = p*
B + d.32 How-
ever, the firm will only collect p*
B and (q*
D ? d) will be collected by the
government as the duty revenue.
Considering that the foreign firm passes on to the consumers the
whole duty burden so that the market price is p*
D = p*
B + d, the domes-















32 GATT/OMC rules recommend that the duty must be the necessary to remove the injury
caused to the domestic industry. This implies that although prices in the domestic market are
matched, the dumping margin pF – p*
B is not necessarily eliminated. However, this will only
reduce the size of d without any change in the final outcome.economía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XIV, núm. 1, primer semestre de 2005 59
tic firm’s new price facing its rival’s price q*
D is determined by its BR
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Proposition 1. With probability a = 1, duties are imposed to for-
eign firm exports. pD is greater than pB and p*
D is smaller than p*
B.
Proof: To see that p*
D < p*
B note that demand assumptions imply that
a higher price results in a reduction of the quantity sold such that
q*
D < q*
B; foreign firms collects only p*
B and the government’s duty rev-
enue dq*







To see that pD > pB it is enough to note that the domestic firm is
acting under its best reply function for any price increase by the for-
eign firm. Hence, a higher price combination than (p*B, pB) results in
greater profits. Likewise, pD > p*
D. Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 implies that the price increase of the domestic firm
is smaller than the price increase of the foreign firm as only the former is
acting on its best reply function. Consequently, the foreign firm sells
less at a higher price. Moreover, the foreign firm never collects (d ? q*
D)
the government’s revenue. Therefore, AD policy makes the domestic
firm better off.
Firm’s expected profits when they face AD policy in the domestic
market can be expressed by
EP(a) = aPD + (1 – a)PB (7)
33 If the foreign firm passes on to the consumer only a fraction of the duty instead of the whole
amount, the price increase would be smaller. However, the final outcome remains the same.60 Mendieta: Alternative Effects of Antidumping Policy
EP*(a) = aP*
D + (1 – a)P*
B (8)
Corollary 1. The introduction of AD policy changes the expected profit
of the firms. This in turn implies that for every positive value of a:
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
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As a consequence of the price distortion that firms face with the
introduction of AD policy, the filing of a petition becomes a dominant
strategy for the domestic firm for every a > 0. In other words, the ex-
pected profits of filing a petition are greater than the Bertrand-Nash
equilibrium profits that prevail without AD policy.
Note that the size of the duty imposed depends only on the dump-
ing strategy of the foreign firm, that is the difference between PF and
P*
B.34 The foreign firm will try to avoid the imposition of duties or at
least to reduce d by setting a higher price relative to the free trade
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium price  P*
B.
Proposition 2. In order to avoid the imposition of duties, the for-
eign firm will set a higher price in the domestic market relative to the
free trade price.
Proof: pF is exogenous with the known probability distribution func-
tion F(?) on [p*
B, p –*], where p –* is the maximum level of pF, i.e. the mo-
nopoly price. Thus, the probability of dumping by the foreign firm is
given by  0
) (
) (   ) ( ) ( 1 <
￿ r








where , dx x F p .  Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 states that due to AD policy firms change their pric-
ing strategy relative to their free trade price strategy. Interestingly,
given the possibility of attainable higher profits, at higher prices lo-
cated within the shaded area depicted in Figure 1, a new game is
developed in pursue of extraordinary profits.
34 A positive injury determination is one of the conditions for duties to be imposed; how-
ever, as the existence of a dumping margin is a necessary condition and without it no AD action
would be pursued, for sake of simplicity the injury effect is not considered here. See Prusa
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V.3. The Collusive Outcome
Let’s turn back to the price distortions generated by the introduction
of AD policy. As a consequence of the imposition of AD duties, consum-
ers in the domestic market face higher prices for both the imported
and the domestic good, and the domestic firm enjoys a larger market
share and higher profits relative to free trade, i.e. without AD policy.
The foreign firm find itself in a worse off position.
As said above, the foreign firm, in an attempt to avoid the imposi-
tion of duties, will set a higher price. This price increase will be smaller
the smaller the difference between PF and P*
B. As the best response to
this price increase, domestic firm will charge a higher price too.
Suppose now that firms maximise the discounted sum of future
profits. Let d be the discount factor and t the number of periods firms
interact with each other. The range value of d lays between 0 and 1.
The closest to 1 the more patient firms are. In other words, patient
firms care about future profits. The present discounted value of per
period profits is, respectively, given by:
t
t















Let PBN and P*BN be the profits in the one-shot static free trade
equilibrium determined before by pB and p*
B, respectively. Let PC and
P*C be the collusive profits and Pd and P*d the profits of deviation
from the collusive agreement. Firms choose the following grim trigger
strategy: start by choosing the collusive price PC, then continue to set
PC until the other firm chooses a lower price Pd. If the other firm sets
Pd, then set the free trade price level forever.
Two important conditions must prevail if this strategy is going to
be subgame perfect: the first one is that interaction between the in-
dustries is foreseen to continue into the future. This is that firms see
each other competing in the domestic market for an infinitely number
of periods, so that they realise that cooperative gains can outweigh
the short-run gains from deviating from the agreement; and the sec-
ond one is that a credible punishment for any deviation from the coop-
erative outcome is necessary.62 Mendieta: Alternative Effects of Antidumping Policy
Before establishing the factors that make these conditions exist, it
is important to note the following. It is clear now that when the free
trade price level is chosen, the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prices PB
and P*
B, the domestic firm can file an AD petition. Thus, the domestic
firm will consider any deviation by the foreign firm from the monopoly
price as a dumping action. This will be the case when PF is the mo-
nopoly price in the foreign firm’s home market. If the home market
structure were more competitive, PF would be below the monopoly
price and might be closer to P *
B ? PF can also be interpreted as the
foreign firm’s average cost, so that AD action against sells bellow cost
can be claimed when Pd # PF.
To be the grim trigger strategy35 a subgame perfect equilibrium, it
is needed that both the cooperation strategy and the punishment strat-
egy are Nash equilibrium.
Let’s consider first the punishment strategy. Either firm’s devia-
tion from the cooperative price will make the other firm choose the
free trade level price forever. It will not make sense to choose PC any-
more if the other chooses PB (or P*
B) at every next period. Thus coop-
eration is a Nash equilibrium strategy.
Suppose now that the domestic firm sticks to the collusive price.
From equation (9), its discounted profits from cooperation are:
d -
P




c c c ... (11)
If the firm deviates by undercutting its rival at price pd P [pB, pF],
it will get in the current period a greater profit Pd (because of a larger
market share) plus the subsequently non-cooperative profits PNE. Thus,
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35 It is so called because any deviation from the collusive agreement will make the punish-
ment strategy be played forever.economía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XIV, núm. 1, primer semestre de 2005 63
Because the grim trigger strategy is symmetric, the same result is
obtained for the foreign firm. However, note that, from previous sec-
tions, incentives for deviation are asymmetric when AD policy exists.
Deviation by the foreign firm will trigger the filing of an AD petition.
This changes the value of the second term on the right-hand side of
condition (13) (for a = 1).
Proposition 3. Under the absence of AD, cooperation towards the
collusive outcome can be sustained only if (expressed in terms of the do-
mestic firm):
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
*
B B
BN C * d d C * C C P P P P P P , , 1 , P d + P d - ‡ P (14)
Under AD policy, cooperation toward the collusive outcome can be
sustained only if:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) F F D
C d d C * C C P , P BR P , P P , P P d + P d - ‡ P 1 (15)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) F F
*
D
C d * d * C * C C * P , P BR P , P P , P P d + P d - ‡ P 1 (16)
Proposition 3 states that any collusive agreement sustained un-
der the existence of AD policy require the firms to make a different
appraisal of future profits relative to that under free trade. This is
straightforward by comparing condition (14) with (15) and (16). The
second term on the right-hand side of condition (15) is greater relative
to the second term on the right-hand side of condition (14) when a = 1.
This means that the possibility of greater profits for the domestic firm
when duties are imposed increases its incentive to deviate; hence-
forth a higher value of d is required. On the other hand, the second
term on the right-hand side of condition (16) is smaller relative to the
second term on the right-hand side of both (15) and (14). This means
that in order to be collusion sustainable the foreign firm requires a
smaller value of d relative to both free trade and the domestic firm
(see annex for a numerical example).
The model here presented suggests that AD policy changes firms’
appraisal of future profits determined by the value of the discount
factor d, relative to free trade. A simple numerical example of the
changes in the discount factor induced by the introduction of AD policy
is presented in the Annex.64 Mendieta: Alternative Effects of Antidumping Policy
VI. Concluding Comments
In this paper, I have first intended to show through the revision of
previous literature on the topic that there are widely recognised in-
centives for the use of AD measures which outcomes differ from the
original aim of the policy. I focus in one of this alternative outcome:
tacit collusion. Using a game theoretical framework, I presented a
model which in the first part builds on standard results of models
with antidumping and in the second suggests a collusive mechanism
where firms attain cooperative gains.
When a domestic firm and a foreign firm that compete in prices in
the domestic market face the imposition of duties to imports, the do-
mestic firm’s strategic response to the price increase of the foreign
firm is a higher price set along its best reply function. The resulting
Nash equilibrium of this one-shot static game is higher prices in the
domestic firm with larger profits for the domestic firm and smaller
for the foreign firm, relative to the free trade Nash-equilibrium. Be-
cause the filing of a petition is a dominant strategy for the domestic
firm, by increasing its price, the foreign firm will try to avoid the im-
position or reduce the level of duties.
The second part of the model suggests that the price increase in-
duced by the introduction of AD policy aids firms to target monopoly
prices in pursue of the anticompetitive outcome. Engaging in a grim
trigger mechanism, with the filing of a petition used as the punish-
ment strategy to restore cooperation, firms achieve the collusive out-
come when the one-shot static game is repeated infinitely. The effect
of AD policy in this cooperative strategy is that the threshold value of
the discount factors that sustain the collusive conditions are altered,
relative to its free trade values. This is, the discount factor that makes
the domestic firm sustain the collusive agreement becomes smaller
whereas foreign firm’s discount factor becomes greater. In other words,
AD policy delays domestic firm’s propensity to collude while prompt-
ing foreign firm’s.
Some comments are made regarding the robustness of these re-
sults. First, it is well known that high industry concentration and
product homogeneity are factors that facilitate collusion, among oth-
ers. Despite the need of further analysis to characterise the market
structure of specific Mexican AD cases, this paper draws attention on
whether competition authorities should turn their eyes to a number
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be corrected by the use of AD policy. Moreover, empirical evidence of
Mexican AD cases show that domestic industry-specific factors, such
as market power, market share and concentration, are relevant for
the filing of AD petitions (Niels, 2002; Esquivel and Solis, 2002). Evi-
dence of international cartels formed by firms from both developed
and developing countries has also been proved welfare costly for im-
porting developing countries (Levenstein et al., 2003).36 Nevertheless,
further empirical research is necessary to investigate whether AD
measures are an instrument cartels resort to as a systematic support
of the collusive agreement.
Second, further extensions to the basic model of collusion here
presented (e.g. cost asymmetry, endogenisation of PF) are necessary to
determine the conditions in which collusion may be facilitated under
AD policy within this framework.
Third, although the model attempts to highlight the proceedings
of Mexican AD policy, it is, however, developed within WTO’s AD recom-
mendations, which implies that the results reached are consistent glo-
bally.
Abolition of AD rules has come up as a solution to the problem of
AD among country members within integration initiatives such as the
EU and the Australian-New Zealand trade agreement. If tangible re-
sults from the debate on the reform of AD to efficiently address the
costs of trade liberalisation are yet to come, special attention should
be paid to active AD user industries such as chemicals, pharmaceutics,
cement or steel, where collusive behaviours have been recently brought
into concern.
Annex
The first row of the Table A.1 shows the free trade expected payoffs
each firm obtains at the respective strategy they choose in the re-
peated game. Remember that the grim trigger strategy they engage
in to achieve collusion is symmetric, so the payoffs structure is the
same for the two firms. Column three shows the Bertrand-Nash equilib-
36 A Mexican firm participated as a member of the Tampico Fiber Cartel formed also by the
US and the Netherlands during January 1990-April 1995. Another Mexican firm was also
a member of the Lysine Cartel investigated by the US Department of Justice. Although not a
member of the Graphite Electrodes Cartel, a main Mexican producer was also related in the
cartel’s activities (Levenstein et al., 2003).66 Mendieta: Alternative Effects of Antidumping Policy
rium payoff from the one-shot static game, which in the collusive mecha-
nism is the punishment strategy. Similarly, the next two rows show the
domestic and foreign firm’s payoffs under AD policy, respectively. Here,
expected payoffs of the punishment strategy are altered because of the
possibility of the imposition of duties to imports. This is reflected in the sec-
ond term on the right-hand side of conditions (15) and (16).
Now, by substituting the payoffs of Table A.1 into conditions (14),
(15) and (16) for every value of d throughout its range, Table A.2 shows
the threshold value of d that makes collusion sustainable according to the
grim trigger mechanism. It can be observed that under free trade,
condition (14) holds for a d value of 0.4. Once AD policy is introduced,
the value of d required to sustain the collusive outcome given by (15)
increases to 0.5. Contrarily, a smaller value of d is required for the
foreing firm to satisfy condition (16), bringing it down to 0.2 in this nu-
merical example.
Table A.2. Collusive Mechanism. Profits and Value of d
Free trade AD policy
Domestic firm’s Foreign firm’s
profits profits
d (14) (15) (16)
0 5.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 5.00 6.00
0.1 5.56 6.33 5.56 6.44 5.56 6.11
0.2 6.25 6.75 6.25 7.00 6.25 6.25
0.3 7.14 7.29 7.14 7.71 7.14 6.43
0.4 8.33 8.00 8.33 8.67 8.33 6.67
0.5 10.00 9.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 7.00
0.6 12.50 10.50 12.50 12.00 12.50 7.50
0.7 16.67 13.00 16.67 15.33 16.67 8.33
0.8 25.00 18.00 25.00 22.00 25.00 10.00
0.9 50.00 33.00 50.00 42.00 50.00 15.00
1 0.00 6.00 0.00 6.00 0.00 6.00
Table A.1. Strategies and Payoffs
Cooperation Deviation B-N equilibrium
Free trade 5 6 3
AD
Domestic firm 5 6 4
AD
Foreign firm 5 6 1economía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XIV, núm. 1, primer semestre de 2005 67
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